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UNITED STATES v. SALERNO: THE BAIL REFORM
ACT IS HERE TO STAY
INTRODUCTION
The passage of the 1984 Bail Reform Act (the "Act")' fundamentally
changed the function of bail in the United States criminal law system2 by
allowing persons accused of criminal offenses to be held without bail if they
are found to present a danger to the community.3 Previously, an accused
was denied bail only when a fair adjudication could not be otherwise
ensured.4 The Act represented a change in society's attitude towards the
concept of bail. An increase in the incidence of crime by persons released
on bail pending trial generated fear among the population and this fear
served as the impetus for this Act.'
The concept of "preventive detention, ' 6 as pretrial incarceration is known,
is a controversial issue in the United States courts.7 The Act has repeatedly
been challenged as unconstitutional under both the excessive bail clause of
the eighth amendment8 and the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 9
Recently, the Supreme Court addressed these issues in United States v.
Salerno'0 and held that the Bail Reform Act did not violate either amend-
ment."I
This Note suggests that the Supreme Court did not address all the impor-
tant factors which should be used to determine the Act's constitutionality.
The Note will demonstrate that upon examination of these factors, the Court
should have concluded that the Act was unconstitutional. The Act should
have been deemed an impermissible punishment prior to adjudication of the
I. The Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1985 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3141-56 (Supp. III 1985)).
2. See infra notes 29-34.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1985).
4. See infra note 19.
5. See infra note 30.
6. "'Preventive detention' has become a catch-phrase for those sections of the Bail Reform
Act of 1984 which give judges the authority to incarcerate an accused prior to trial to 'prevent'
him from committing crimes while out on bail." Note, As Time Goes By: Pretrial Incarceration
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 8 CsARozo L. REv.
1055, 1056 n.6 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Pretrial Incarceration].
7. See infra note 69.
8. The eighth amendment states: "le]xcessive bail shall not be required ...." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
9. The fifth amendment states: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
11. Id. at 2105.
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case, and a violation of due process.' 2 Finally, this Note will describe the
negative impact of the Salerno decision on future preventive detention cases
and analyze the abuses Salerno could generate. Stricter guidelines should be
set up so as not to allow a person merely "accused" of a crime to be
imprisoned for an unreasonable amount of time before trial.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Bail Before The Act
The statutory history of bail began with the passage of the Judiciary Act
in 1789." The Judiciary Act guaranteed all persons accused of non-capital
crimes the right to be released on bail.' 4 Prior to the passage of the 1984
Bail Reform Act, federal law provided for release on bail in all but three
circumstances. 5 These three exceptions prohibited persons from being re-
leased on ball if: (1) the court believed there was a risk of flight;' 6 (2) the
court believed there was a risk that the defendant would tamper with
witnesses or jurors; 7 or (3) if the person was accused of committing a capital
crime.' The policy underlying these exceptions was that of preserving the
12. "Where the state seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication [of guilt],
the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 n.40 (1977). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
535 (1979) ("[A) detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance
with due process of law.").
13. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 91.
14. "From the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . federal law has unequivocally
provided that a person arrested for a noncapital offense shall be admitted to bail." Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Melendez-Carrion,
790 F.2d 984, 997 (1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1987) ("First Judiciary Act ... provided
a right to bail in all cases except capital offenses .... ); Ervin, Preventive Detention, A
Species of Lydford Law, 52 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 113 (1983) ("This [Judiciary] Act... secures
the right to release on bail before trial to every person charged with a noncapital federal
crime"); Comment, Section 3142(e) of the 1984 Bail Reform Act: Rebuttable Presumption or
Mandatory Detention?, 35 Bup'Mvo L. Rv. 693, 694 n.7 (1986) (hereinafter Comment, Re-
buttable Presumption] (Judiciary Act gives those persons charged with noncapital crimes the
right to be released on bail).
15. "The fundamental tradition in this country is that one charged with a crime is not, in
ordinary circumstances, imprisoned until after a judgment of guilt." Bandy v. United States,
81 S. Ct. 197 (1960) (application of reduction of bail). The Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-465, 80 Star. 214 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-51 (1982) (repealed 1984)).
16. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1002; United
States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3, 5 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
17. See Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 667-68 (1962) (denial of bail pending appeal);
Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 643-44 (1961) (denial of bail during trial); Melendez-
Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1002 and authorities cited therein.
18. The Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (repealed 1984). See Stack, 342 U.S.
at 4 ("[A] person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail") (emphasis in
original); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1326 n.6 (D.C. App. 1981) (en banc), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982) (denial of bail to persons accused of capital crimes due to fear
they would not appear in court).
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integrity of the judicial process, thereby ensuring a just result. 9 The defen-
dant gained the right of release if the court felt reasonably assured that he
would satisfy three conditions. These conditions were that defendant: (a)
appear at trial; (b) not influence the jury or tamper with witnesses; and, (c)
"submit to sentence if found guilty." 20 Other pretrial detention was permis-
sible only for the period necessary to take the "administrative steps incident
to arrest."12'
In 1970, Congress enacted the first preventive detention statute ("D.C.
Act")." The D.C. Act applies solely to the District of Columbia. The D.C.
19. "[Djenial of bail was perceived as a mechanism for preserving the integrity of the trial
process .. .the law required that the goal of a judicial officer in setting bail was to ensure
that the defendant would be available for trial and ... could not improperly influence the
outcome of the trial." Comment, Rebuttable Presumption, supra note 14, at 695. See also
Stack, 342 U.S. at 4 (in order that the defendant be released on bail, court must be assured
that "he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty."); Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d
at 1002 (measures may be taken to assure defendant appears at trial); Comment, Preventive
Detention: Liberty in the Balance, 46 MD. L. Rav. 378, 383 (1987) [hereinafter Comment,
Liberty in the Balance] ("Prevention of flight and protection of witnesses and jurors ... do
not serve to protect the safety of the general community ... [but] ensures that the trial society
demands will be a fair one.").
20. Stack, 342 U.S. at 4. This rationale is apparent with respect to the first two exceptions
because there will not be a fair trial if the accused is not present or if the jurors and witnesses
have been threatened or bribed. Persons accused of capital crimes were denied bail because
they were an extreme flight risk. A person released on bail with the knowledge that if he
appears in court, he will face the possibility of a death sentence or life imprisonment, may
reevaluate his options before entering the court room. State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 369,
164 A.2d 740, 743 (1960) (citing United States v. Williams, 30 N.J. 105, 125, 152 A.2d 9, 19
(1959)). The denial of bail for capital offenses was not an expression of the colonists' intent
to detain all defendants presumed dangerous to the community. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d
at 998. "The underlying motive for denying bail in the prescribed type of capital offenses is
to assure the accused's presence at trial." Konigsberg, 743 A.2d at 743 (quoted in Melendez-
Carrion, 790 F.2d at 997).
The first two exceptions [capital crimes and risk of flight] were, in fact, closely
related. Capital defendants were not refused bail on the ground that, if released,
they were likely to endanger the safety of the community. Historically, many offenses
that carried the death penalty were not dangerous to the community at large. The
majority of courts and commentators have suggested that capital defendants were
simply thought more likely to flee in order to avoid prosecution .... In essence,
the capital defendant exception was a corollary of the second exception; capital
defendants were deemed per se likely to flee.
Comment, Liberty in the Balance, supra note 19, at 382-83 n.39. See also Edwards, 430 A.2d
at 1326 n.6 (persons accused of capital crimes historically were denied bail because they were
not likely to appear at trial when faced with a possible death penalty sentence).
21. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (for any longer detention probable cause
hearing is required). "There is, of course, a de minimis level of imposition with which the
Constitution is not concerned." Ingraham at 430 U.S. 674 (1976) (emphasis in original) (liberty
interests are implicated when a child is punished appreciably for misconduct).
22. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to -1332 (1981). This was the first preventive detention
statute to apply to competent adults. Cf. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (juveniles held
in detention to protect against harm to themselves and the community); Addington v. Texas,
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Act allows for pretrial detention upon a court's finding that the defendant
presents a danger to the community.23 The purpose of the D.C. Act is to
reduce violent crimes4 and eliminate hypocrisy in the bail process which is
the result of judges setting bail artificially high, thereby effectively detaining
an accused. 2' Although this Act represents only the second major change in
bail law since 1789,26 it has had little impact because it is seldom used by
the courts."7 Nonetheless, the D.C. Act provided the model for the Act.28
441 U.S. 418 (1979) (mentally ill persons who are unable to take care of themselves can be
civilly committed). See generally United States v. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Japanese
and descendants detained as threat to United States).
23. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a). See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 6, reprinted
in, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADunN. NEws (98 Stat.) 3188-89 [hereinafter 1984 S. REP.].
24. Public concern over the increase in crimes committed by those released on bal put
pressure on the Nixon administration to create the Act. Ervin, supra note 14, at 113. "When
he sought the presidency in 1968, Richard M. Nixon promised the American people he would
solve the nation's crime problem if he was elected." Id. at 115. See Comment, Preventive
Detention and United States v. Edwards: Burdening the Innocent, 32 Am. U.L. REv. 191, 192-
93 n.15 (1982); Note, Pretrial Incarceration, supra note 6, at 1063 n.46; Tribe, An Ounce of
Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371 (1970).
25. See Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1966: Hearings on S. Res. 43 Before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 220-21 (1969) (statement of Tim Murphy, Judge of the District of Columbia Court of
General Sessions); ABA Advisory Comm. on Pretrial Proceedings, STANDARDS RELTINO TO
PRET L RELEAsE 6 (Tent. Draft 1968).
26. The Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3141-51 (1982) (repealed 1984)), was the first major change to the system of bail. This
change, however, was not directed towards the dangerousness of the accused, but towards
assuring that "all persons, regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained
pending their appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal, when detention serves
neither the ends of justice nor the public interest." H.R. REP. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
3, reprinted in, 1966 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADnN. NEWS (89 Stat.) 2295. This change did not
make any additions or deletions to the three traditional categories in which ball was denied. In
contrast, the D.C. Act placed no restriction on a judge's use of money as a pretense for
detention. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Ap-
proaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. Rav. 510, 512 n.4 (1986).
27. See H.R. RE. No. 1419, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976) (in the first five years of
enactment, the statute was only invoked an average of once a month); Ervin, supra note 14,
at 116 ("(D]etention statute is rarely invoked in the courts of the District of Columbia"). But
see 1984 S. Rm., supra note 23, at 8-9, 22, 1984 CODE CONO. & ADm. NEws at 3190-91,
3205, which states that the use of the D.C. Act has recently been expanded because the lower
courts have repeatedly held its provisions constitutional and because "prosecutors are learning
to use it more efficiently and effectively." Id. at 9. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 3191.
28. The D.C. Act and Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1321, both provided support for the 1984 Act.
Note, Pretrial Incarceration, supra note 6, at 1075. In Edwards, the appellate court upheld the
D.C. Act's constitutionality. The accused was charged with armed rape and was denied bail
prior to trial because he was found to be a danger to the community. The court dismissed
Edwards' claim that the D.C. Act was unconstitutional on both fifth amendment due process
and eighth amendment excessive ball grounds. The court relied on its finding that there is a
compelling state interest in protecting the public from injury. See 1984 S. REP., supra note 23,
at 8-9, 22, 1984 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADmiN. NEws at 3190-91, 3205; Comment, Rebuttable
Presumption, supra note 14, at 702.
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B. 1984 Bail Reform Act
1. Purpose of the Act
The purpose of the Act was two-fold. First, the legislature designed the
Act to address the problem of increasing criminal activity by persons on
pretrial release, thereby responding to29 society's concern about the growing
number of persons in this category committing crimes.3 The second purpose
of the Act was to eliminate high bail as a pretense for detention.3' Before
the Act, judges set bail for dangerous criminals at amounts they could not
pay under the pretense that the defendants presented a high risk of flight.
In actuality, the judges set high bail to detain the defendants based on their
propensity for criminal activity.32 In sum, the Act represented a fundamental
change in the law of bail on a widespread national leveP3 and reflected a
29. 1984 S. REP., supra note 23, at 3, 6-7, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADIN. NEws at 3185-
86, 3188-90.
30. The change in law was said to reflect "the deep public concern... about the growing
problem of crimes committed by persons on release" and the recognition that:
there is a small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants as to
whom neither the imposition of stringent release conditions nor the prospect of
revocation of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or other
persons. It is with respect to this limited group of offenders that the courts must
be given the power to deny release pending trial.
United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 80 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting 1984 S. REP., supra note 23,
at 6-7, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmw. NEws at 3188-89. See also Comment, Rebuttable
Presumption, supra note 14, at 693 ("Bail Reform Act ... [is a] response to a perceived
growth in the problem of criminal activity by persons on pretrial release"). See generally
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (purpose of holding Japanese Americans in detention camps was
to ensure national security by protecting against espionage and sabotage).
31. 1984 S. REP., supra note 23, at 15-16, 1984 U.S. CODE CONO. & AMUN4. NEws AT 3198-
99.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) explicitly states "[t]he judicial officer may not impose a financial
condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person." This was the reaction to the
concern that severe financial conditions were being used indirectly to detain dangerous defen-
dants. "The Committee concluded that by providing both a workable pretrial detention statute
and restrictions on the use of financial condition of release, this problem could be effectively
addressed." 1984 S. REP., supra note 23, at 9, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & A34N. NEws at
3192. However, "concern about the potential for such abuse does exist. Consequently, the use
of the conditions of release set out in sections ... [3142(cXIXB)(xi) and (cXIXB)(xiv)J is
specifically limited to the purpose of assuring the appearance of the defendant." Id. at 15-16,
1984 U.S. CODE Cowo. & ADMN. NEws at 3198-99.
33. Section 3142 of the new Bail Reform Act dramatically changes prior law by
induding 'the nature and seriousness of the danger to the community that would
be posed by the persons release' as a factor to be considered in determining
conditions of pretrial release, and by authorizing detention pending trial where 'no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of
the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.'
United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 403 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting 1 U.S.C. 3142(e),
(gX4)). See, e.g., United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 890 (8th Cir. 1985); Leon, 766 F.2d at
80; Natalini, Preventive Detention and Presuming Dangerousness Under the Bail Reform Act
of 1984, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 225 (1985).
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major change in Americans' attitudes toward the function of bail in the
criminal justice system.Y
2. The provisions of the Act
The judicial officer who presides at the defendant's first court appearance,
most often a magistrate, has the authority to release the defendant pending
trial if a detention hearing or detention itself is not warranted. 5 Personal
recognizance and the non-surety bond are the most lenient release condi-
tions. 36 However, if the magistrate feels that these conditions are inadequate
he may condition the non-surety bond with a list of restrictive conditions,
which may include the posting of cash. In the alternative, he may require
the defendant to post a surety bond." The surety bond is required only if
the magistrate feels that the defendant will flee the jurisdiction, notwith-
standing the other measures and conditions."
The purpose of conditioning release on the accused's ability to provide
cash or a surety bond, is specifically limited to guaranteeing the appearance
of the defendant at trial.39 The provision which allows for the conditioning
of release upon satisfaction of a financial requirement is an attempt to
accomplish the second purpose of the Act, to eliminate high bail as a pretense
for detention, thereby ending the problem of judges requiring excessive bonds
under the pretense of risk of flight.40
If a person is accused of committing a crime in certain categories,4' and
the prosecutor moves for a detention hearing, the judicial officer must
34. Grave public danger is said to result from what they may be expected to do, in
addition to what they have done since their conviction. If I assume that defendants
are disposed to commit every opportune disloyal act .... it is still difficult to
reconcile with traditional American law the jailing of persons by the courts because
of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to protect society from
predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so
fraught with danger of excess and injustice that I am loath to resort to it, even as
a discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as those
of which defendants stand convicted.
Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1950) (bail pending appeal).




39. United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 380 (1st Cir. 1985) ("High money bail cannot
be used as a device to keep a defendant in custody before trial.").
40. This provision should not be interpreted to mean that an accused who is unable to post
a bond gets an automatic release. "The statute does not require that a defendant be able to
post the bail 'readily."' United States v. Szott, 768 F.2d 159, 160 (7th Cir. 1985).
41. The categories are:
(A) a crime of violence [statutorily defined in § 3156(4)]; (B) an offense for which
maximum penalty is life imprisonment or death; (C) an offense for which a
maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled
Substances Act .... the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act . . . ; (D)
any felony if the person has been convicted of two or more offenses [from prescribed
categories] ....
§ 3142(f)(l)[(A-D)].
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conduct the hearing.42 The defendant has the right to counsel during this
hearing.43 In addition, the defendant may testify, present evidence in his
favor and cross examine the state's witnesses." If the prosecution proves by
clear and convincing evidence that the accused is a danger to the community
he may be held without bail, pending trial. 4 Moreover, in certain cases,
there is a rebuttable presumption of dangerousness which the defendant must
overcome." The judicial officer makes his decision regarding detention by
considering all of the information presented. 47 The judicial officer must then
prepare a written report containing his findings of fact and the reasons
behind his decision to detain, if such a decision is made." The defendant is
then permitted to seek immediate appellate review of the judicial officer's
decision. 49
42. There is no hearing if the prosecutor fails to move for one. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0. The
prosecutor or judicial officer may also move for a detention hearing if there is risk of flight
or risk that the accused will obstruct justice. § 3142(f)(2)(A-B). This provision incorporates in
the statute the situations in which bail has been traditionally denied.
The Act requires that the detention hearing be held at the time the accused first appears in
front of the judicial officer. However, one of the parties may ask for a continuance. The
defendant may ask for up to five days, and the prosecution may ask for up to three days. The
judicial officer has the discretion to extend these periods if "good cause" is shown. § 3142(f).




46. § 3142(e). The categories in which a rebuttable presumption arises are as follows:
In a case described in subsection (f)(1) of this section, a rebuttable presumption
arises that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
safety of any other person and the community if such judicial officer finds that-
(1) the person has been convicted of a federal offense that is described in subsection
(f)(l) of this section, or of a State or local offense that would have been an
offense described in subsection (f)(1) of this section if a circumstance giving rise
to Federal jurisdiction had existed;
(2) the offense described in paragraph (1) of this subsection was committed while
the person was on release pending trial for a Federal, State, or local offense; and
(3) a period of not more than five years has elapsed since the date of conviction,
or the release of the person from imprisonment, for the offense described in
paragraph (1) of this subsection, whichever is later.
Id. If it applies to the case, the presumption creates a "strong probability ... that no form
of conditional release will be adequate" and the accused must be detained unless he meets the
burden of producing some evidence in rebuttal. Jessup, 757 F.2d at 382 (quoting 1984 S. REP.,
supra note 23, at 19, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADnbu. NEws at 3202).
47. The list of factors to consider are:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the
offense is a crime of violence or involves a narcotic drug;
(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person; and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that
would be posed by the person's release ....
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1-4).
48. § 3142(i).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (Supp. III 1985).
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The Bail Reform Act lacks a maximum time limit for detention, a feature
of the D.C. Act. The D.C. Act specifically provides for a 60 day limit with
one good cause extension of 30 days.-* A detainee, therefore, cannot be held
before trial for more than three months. Congress, when enacting the Act,
intended the maximum length of the detention to be governed by the Speedy
Trial Act of 1974,1' which requires that criminal trials begin within 90 days
of indictment.52 However, the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act allow for
a variety of continuances which could cause the period of confinement to
exceed 90 days.53
II. THE PUNISHMENT-RsouLATION CONTROVERSY
The primary objection of those opposed to preventive detention is that it
constitutes impermissible punishment before adjudication, in violation of the
fifth amendment.5 4 Therefore, one who challenges a preventive detention
statute as violative of the fifth amendment, must first establish that the
period of detention is punitive and not regulatory. The test to determine
whether a legislative enactment is regulatory or punitive was promulgated
22 years before passage of the Bail Reform Act in the case of Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez." The Kennedy Court held that the test should apply
50. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d) (1981).
51. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985)). The Bail Reform Act does not set an explicit
time limit on pretrial detention of the accused. The legislature relied instead on the Speedy
Trial Act to govern this provision. 130 CONG. REc. S941 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1984) (statement of
Sen. Thurmond). "The narrow parameters of the Speedy Trial Act, while not decisive, suggest
the strong congressional policy in favor of a speedy trial for the incarcerated. That Act should
be read together with the statutory bail provisions and the Constitution in arriving at a sound
statutory construction." United States v. Colombo, 616 F. Supp. 780, 786 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b) (1982).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
54. See supra note 12.
55. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), the Court looked at whether §
401(j) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 58 Stat. 746 (amended in 1944), and § 349(aXIO) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(10))
which impose forfeiture of citizenship for "remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the United
States, in time of war or national emergency for the purpose of evading or avoiding training
and service in the nation's armed forces," id., are unconstitutional as impermissible punishment
before adjudication. "It is fundamental that the great powers of Congress to conduct war and
to regulate the Nation's foreign relations are subject to the Constitutional requirements of due
process." Id. at 164-65. The Court held that the statutes were unconstitutional as punishment
in that they did not provide adequate procedural safeguards. The Kennedy Court promulgated
the following test to determine whether the legislation was regulatory or punitive in absence of
a clear punitive intent:
[1) the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
[21 . . . it has historically been regarded as a punishment,
[3) . .. it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
[4] ... its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
[Vol. 38:165
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only when the punitive nature of the legislative enactment is not apparent.
If the purpose of the statute is not clearly punitive, the Kennedy test should
then be used to determine the statute's classification. Courts have used
various interpretations of this test since it was established. s6
The Kennedy test was subsequently abbreviated by the Supreme Court in
Bell v. Wolfish." At issue in Bell were certain conditions of confinement in
a federally operated custodial facility." In Bell, the Court discussed the
entire test but then proceeded, in dicta, to apply only two of the factors.,9
The Court applied its version of the test to conclude that various prison
conditions which the detainees were subjected to, such as double-bunking
and strip-searching, were regulatory. 60
In United States v. Edwards, 6 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
applied the Kennedy test to determine the constitutionality of the District of
Columbia pretrial detention statute. Under the D.C. Act, a person arrested
for certain offenses could be held for up to 60 days pending trial. 62 The
court discussed several factors of the test in a cursory fashion, and then
focused on the one factor which the court determined was critical to its
analysis. 63 That critical factor was whether the legislature contemplated an
and deterrence,
[5] . .. the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
[61 .. . an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and
[7] . . . it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all
relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in differing directions.
Absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a
statute, these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face.
Id. at 168-69 (citations omitted). The Kennedy Court did not actually apply the test because it
found that the legislative history clearly showed that the statute had a punitive intent. "The
objective manifestations of congressional purpose indicate conclusively that the provisions in
question can only be interpreted as punitive." Id. at 169.
56. See infro notes 57-68.
57. 441 U.S. 520 (1978). A condensed version of the test was more recently used in United
States v. Kouyoumdjian, 601 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (pretrial detention did not
violate defendant's due process rights).
58. 441 U.S. at 527.
59. The Bell Court's analysis was that:
[Aibsent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of the detention
facility official, that determination [whether the punishment is regulatory] will turn
on 'whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be
connected is assignable for it and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternate purpose assigned [to it].'
441 U.S. at 538 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
60. 441 U.S. at 540.
61. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
62. Id. at 1323 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. 23-1322 (1973)).
63. The Court determined that preventive detention did not further the traditional aims of
punishment, deterrence, retribution or rehabilitation. The Court also determined that preventive
detention was an affirmative restraint but found that this was constitutional because detention
without bail for the traditional reasons also causes an affirmative restraint. Id. at 1333.
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alternative punitive purpose when establishing the D.C. Act. ' The Edwards
court concluded that the sole purpose of the D.C. Act was to prevent the
recurrence of dangerous acts by the defendant while out on bail.6 1 The court
determined that this purpose was regulatory and therefore upheld the D.C.
Act."
In Schail v. Martin,67a case involving a preventive detention statute aimed
at juveniles, the Supreme Court first determiiid that the New York statute's
express intent was not to punish." The court relied on the statute's strict
time limit of 17 days for detention and humane conditions of confinement
to reach this conclusion. The court then used the abbreviated version of the
Kennedy test to determine that the statute was regulatory, and therefore,
constitutional."
III. CAsS SINcE TAE ACT
The constitutionality of the 1984 Bail Reform Act has been repeatedly
challenged in the courts.7 0 The two principal arguments advanced are that it
violates the excessive bail clause of the eighth amendment" and the due
64. Id. at 1332. The Edwards court reasoned that "[tihe traditional reasons for pretrial
detention, preventing flight or the intimidation .of witnesses, serve the 'alternative purpose' of
preserving the integrity of the judicial process, and thus are preventive and forward looking."
Id.
65. 430 A.2d at 1332-33.
66. Id. at 1333.
67. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
68. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 320.3(3)(b) (McKinney 1983).
69. 467 U.S. at 274.
70. See Infra notes 72-97 and accompanying text.
71. Over the years, lower courts have relied on two conflicting Supreme Court cases to
debate the issue of a constitutional right to bail. Opponents of an absolute right to bail have
relied on dicta from Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1951), to decide the issue. Carlson, a
civil case, stated that the text of the eighth amendment failed to ensure this right. "Indeed,
the very language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable. We think, clearly,
here that the Eighth Amendment does not require that bail be allowed under the circumstances
of these cases." Id. at 545-46. In contrast, a case decided just prior to Carlson, Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1 (1951), stated in its dicta that there was a right to freedom from detention before
trial. Id. at 4. Proponents of the right to bail frequently cite this case to support their arguments.
The latest trend on the issue was advanced in Edwards "neither the historical evidence nor
contemporary fundamental values implicit in the criminal justice system requires recognition of
the right to bail as a 'basic human right' which must then be construed to be of constitutional
dimensions." 430 A.2d at 1331 (quoting Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (pt.
1), 113 U. PA. L. Rv. at 969 (1965)). See also United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283,
1287 (N.D. Cal 1985) ("[T]he excessive bail clause of the Eighth Amendment does not preclude
Congress from enacting a law that provides for pretrial detention without bail in certain types
of cases"); United States v. Kouyoumdijan, 601 F. Supp 1506, 1511 (C.D. Cal. 1985) ("Tlhe
determination whether bail is permissible for a particular offense is a duty of Congress rather
than a duty of the courts interpreting the Eighth Amendment."). In Melendez-Carrion, 790
F.2d 984 (2nd Cir. 1986), a case decided after the enactment of the Bail Reform Act, the court
stated that in cases of flight, bail may be denied if no amount will ensure a defendant's
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process clause of the fifth amendment." A majority of lower courts have
upheld the constitutionality of the Act against challenges based on these
arguments.
A. Per Se Constitutional
in United States v. Portes," the Seventh Circuit specifically addressed
both constitutional issues. In Portes, the defendant was indicted as part of
a drug trafficking network . 74 The magistrate found that the crime fell under
the rebuttable presumption provision of the Act. Under this provision, it
was presumed the defendent would be a danger to the community, and
because the defendant offered no evidence to rebut this presumption, he
could be detained."
In his defense, the defendant first argued that the eighth amendment
created a consitutional right to bail. The court, relying on prior case law,
held that there was no such right,' 6 and therefore, the Act did not violate
the eighth amendment. The defendant next claimed that the Bail Reform
Act violated his fifth amendment due process rights. He first asserted that
the Act permitted punishment prior to adjudication of guilt." The court,
relying on United States v. Edwards, held that there was no such violation.' 8
In Edwards, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals looked to the
legislative history of the statute to determine the purpose behind the D.C.
Act. 79 In Edwards, the court concluded that the purpose of the D.C. Act
appearance. Id. at 997. The Melendez-Carrion court relied on previous decisions in the same
direction. See generally United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1986) (order denying
bail is proper under the Act where there is significant risk of flight). The Bail Reform Act
implies that there is no eighth amendment right to bail and the majority of lower courts have
settled the issue in that direction. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 112 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Divarco, 602 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (N.D. I11. 1985); Duker, Right to Bail: A
Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REv. 33 (1977); Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention
(pts. I and 2), 60 Gao. L. J. 1139, 1381 (1973).
72. One due process argument put forth is that the Act infringes on an individual's liberty
interest. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 988. Critics of preventive detention argue that the
compelling governmental interest in preventing crime is not more important than an individual's
liberty interest. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1367 (Mack, J., dissenting). Another rationale is that
the Act permits impermissible punishment before adjudication. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at
1004. Opponents of this argument state that the Act regulates and does not punish. United
States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 77 (2d Cir. 1986) (Feinberg, C.J., dissenting) (government has
concrete basis for predicting accused will commit additional crimes). For further discussion on
this topic see infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
73. 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1985).
74. Id. at 760.
75. ld. at 761.
76. Id. at 766. See supra note 52.
77. 786 F.2d at 767.
78. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. App. 1981).
79. 786 F.2d at 767.
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was to protect the community and that this was a legitimate regulatory
purpose. s° The Portes court held that the D.C. Act's purpose of protecting
the community from dangerous criminals was incorporated into the legislative
history of the Act. Therefore, the Court found applicable the Edwards
determination that the D.C. Act was regulatory and not punitive in nature.8'
The defendant also contended that the procedures of the Act infringed on
his liberty interest.8 " The court relied on prior decisions to conclude that the
procedural safeguards in the Act were adequate to insure against erroneous
and unnecessary deprivation. 3 Finally, the defendant claimed that the po-
tential length of detention was impermissible under the due process clause.
s4
The court found this argument was premature because there had not yet
been an extended period of detention.8" The court concluded that because
no valid argument challenging the constitutionality of the Act existed, the
conviction should be upheld.
Other courts have utilized a similar analysis to reach the same conclusion.8"
In United States v. Perry,s7 the defendant was charged with conspiracy to
possess heroin, a crime that falls under the rebuttable presumption provision
80. Id. at 1332. In Edwards, the court applied portions of the test promulgated in Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1962), to determine if the legislative enactment was
regulatory or punitive.
81. 786 F.2d at 767.
82. Id.
83. In United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1397 (3d Cir. 1985), the defendant, a pretrial
detainee, challenged the method and scope of review of the district court under section 3145(f)
of the Act. The court held that the procedural safeguards afforded the defendant by the Act
were adequate and stated, "[w]hile the paucity of court decisions construing the new Act may
have contributed some uncertainty regarding the interstices of the statute, this seems no different
from the situation whenever any new law takes effect. There is no due process violation in this
regard." Id. at 1398. See also Jessup, 757 F.2d at 386 (because of procedural protections, the
Act's rebuttable presumption provision does not cause the Act to violate due process); Freitas,
602 F. Supp. at 1292 ("[Plrocedures specified in Bail Act for a pretrial detention hearing are
adequate to protect against erroneous and unnecessary deprivations of liberty.").
84. 786 F.2d at 768.
85. Id. The court relied on United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), rev'g, 616 F.
Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), which held that it would not decide whether the length of delay
was in violation of due process because the issue at that point was purely speculative. "We do
not know how much longer the trial will be delayed, or what circumstances may necessitate
any additional delays.... Moreover, Colombo had not availed himself of the opportunity to
expedite his trial or for a severance." 777 F.2d at 101.
86. United States v. Rodriquez, 803 F.2d 1102-03 (lth Cir.) (agreeing with Third and
Seventh Circuits that Bail Reform Act is constitutional), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3235 (1986);
United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 548 (1st Cir. 1986) ("[It is reasonable that due process
will permit a dangerous defendant to be held longer than would otherwise be permissible because
he is physically unfit for trial although fit enough to remain dangerous."); United States v.
Knight, 636 F. Supp. 1462 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (pretrial detention did not violate the defendant's
due process rights); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501 (D.P.R. 1984) a'ffd,
755 F.2d 203 (1985) (preventive detention without bail did not violate eighth amendment's
prohibition of excessive bail).
87. 788 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986).
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of the Act.8 The court relied on Carlson v. Landon,8 9 to conclude that the
eighth amendment does not create an absolute right to bail.9
In United States v. Hazzard,9' the court discussed two of the three due
process issues discussed in Portes. In Hazzard, the defendant was charged
with abducting, kidnapping and transporting the victim across the state line
for the purpose of sexual activity. The defendant argued that the Act violated
his fifth amendment due process rights because it constituted punishment
before adjudication. In addition, the defendant claimed that the community's
safety interest is never greater than the detainee's liberty interest. As in
Portes, the Hazzard court found neither of the arguments persuasive.Y
B. Unconstitutional As Applied
Some courts have also held that although the Bail Reform Act is facially
constitutional, it violates the fifth amendment as applied in a particular
case.93 A fifth amendment violation can occur in cases where the application
of the Act results in long or indeterminate pretrial detention.9 This situation
often arises in complex cases where "good cause" continuances under the
Speedy Trial Act9" are necessary.9 One such case is United States v. Theron,9
in which the Tenth Circuit held that because the defendant would have been
detained between 10 and 14 months before the trial, the detention constituted
punishment. 9 The court gave an order to release the defendant on bail to
88. Id. at 103.
89. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
90. 430 A.2d at 1332.
91. 598 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
92. Id. at 1451. The court first held that the government's interest was not just legitimate,
but compelling enough to outweigh the individual's liberty interest. Id. at 1450-51. It then used
a standard from Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) to determine that the detention was not
punishment:
Absent a showing of an express intent to punish on the part of the State, that
determination [whether it is punishment or regulation] generally will turn on 'whether
an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned [to it].'
Id. at 269 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69). Using this standard, the Perry court held
that the legislative history did not show that a purpose of the statute was to punish. 598 F.
Supp. at 1451.
93. See infra note 97.
94. In United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir. 1986), the court stated "at some
point a pretrial detainee denied bail must be tried or released. Although pretrial detention is
permissible when it serves a regulatory rather than a punitive purpose, we believe that valid
pretrial detention assumes a punitive character when it is prolonged significantly." Id. at 1516.
95. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985).
96. United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 387 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(8)(B)(ii)).
97. 782 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir. 1986).
98. Id. at 1516. The court further relied on the fact that the detainee himself had taken no
steps to delay trial. Id.
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prevent any further violation of due process. 99 The court in United States v.
LoFranco used a similar analysis.' ° In that case the defendant was detained
under the Bail Reform Act for six months before trial. The district court
held that because of the complex nature of the case, the Act did not place
any real limit on the length of detention. 0° While courts have varied in their
determination of the length of time which violates the defendant's due process
rights, 02 these cases indicate that the Speedy Trial Act does not always ensure
protection of the detainee's due process rights.
C. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit has deviated from the majority of other courts in
holding the Act unconstitutional per se. 03 First, in United States v. Melendez-
Carrion,1t° the court held that an eight month detention period, based on
preventing future criminal activity, violated due process. 03 The court, how-
ever, could not agree as to whether a shorter period of detention would
make the incarceration constitutional. 06 Judge Newman, writing for the
court, argued that pretrial detention based on a defendant's potential for
dangerous conduct was not a constitutional regulatory measure but imper-
missible punishment in violation of due process.1°, Judge Feinberg's concur-
rence agreed that the Act was unconstitutional as applied in this case, but
only as to the length of time of the defendant's detention.10
Subsequently, the Second Circuit addressed this issue again.'09 In United
States v. Salerno, the majority of the court agreed that the Act violated due
process regardless of the time period." 0 The Court concluded that detention
was only constitutional for the traditional purpose of protecting the judicial
process."' The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari and examined
the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act." 2
99. Id.
100. 620 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D.N.Y. 1985), appeal dismissed sub. nom., United States v.
Cheeseman, 783 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986).
101. Id. at 1326.
102. Compare United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986) (sixteen month pretrial
detention not unconstitutional when case is delayed on defendant's insistence) and United States
v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986) (six month pretrial detention not unconstitutional)
with United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986) (eight month pretrial
detention period unconstitutional) and United States v. Gonzales-Claudio, 806 F.2d 334 (2d
Cir. 1986) (fourteen month detention unconstitutional when trial would not be concluded until
approximately 26 months after detention began).
103. See supra notes 72-97 and accompanying text.
104. 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986).
105. id. at 1004.
106. Id. at 1005 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring).
107. Id. at 1004.
108. Id. at 1005 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring).
109. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986).
110. Id. at 74-75.
111. Id. at 71.
112. 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986). See also United States v. Romano, 799 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1986).
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IV. UNIND STATES V. SALjO
A. The Facts
Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were arrested on March 21, 1986,
on a 26 count indictment. The indictment charged them with offenses
including mail and wire fraud, criminal gambling violations, and violations
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). The
violations of the RICO Act included fraud, extortion, gambling and con-
spiracy to commit murder.'"
At the arraignment, the government moved to detain the defendants under
section 3142(e) of the Bail Reform Act.' 4 The government argued that no
condition of release would assure the safety of the community. The govern-
ment presented evidence that Salerno was the boss of a crime family of
which Cafaro was a member, and that they used violent methods to obtain
their illegal objectives. In addition, witnesses testified that Salerno took part
in two murder conspiracies. Salerno offered character witnesses in his favor
and a letter from his doctor stating that he was in ill health. Cafaro did not
put on any evidence. The district court granted the motion to detain on the
grounds that the government had shown by clear and convincing evidence
that detention was necessary.2 5
On appeal, the defendants argued that the Bail Reform Act was uncon-
stitutional because it allowed persons to be detained based on the likelihood
that they would commit future crimes and thus violated due process." 6 The
Second Circuit held that the Act violated due process,"7 relying largely on,
the opinion of Judge Newman in Melendez-Carrion."11 In Salerno, however,
the majority agreed that the Act was unconstitutional without regard to the
duration of the detention." 9 The court reasoned that the purpose of the
criminal law system was to incarcerate persons for their actual criminal
behavior and not their potential for criminal acts. The court reasoned that
due process does not permit "total deprivation of liberty" as a method to
protect the community from the defendant's likelihood of committing future
crimes. Neither the government's interest in public safety nor the Act's
112. 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986). See also United States v. Romano. 799 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1986).
In that case the court held in accordance with Salerno. In Romano, the defendant was charged
with a controlled substance offense and held without bail prior to trial solely because he was
found to be dangerous. The court held that he must be released on bail. The court withheld
issue of mandate, however, because the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Salerno.
113. Id. at 2099.
114. Id.
115. United States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1363, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
116. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986).
117. Id. at 74-75. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
118. 790 F.2d 984 (1986). See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
119. 794 F.2d at 74.
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procedural safeguards was found to be sufficient to justify detention. 10 The
court also held that, even assuming the Bail Reform Act was regulatory, the
only valid purpose for pretrial detention was to ensure that there was a fair
trial on the merits. The Court stated that otherwise detention could be
imposed only. be taken as "administrative steps incident to arrest.""' The
United States Supreme Court granted the government's petition for certiorari
to address a conflict among the circuits regarding the validity of the Act.1'"
B. The Salerno Court's Holding
The Supreme Court was faced with two issues on appeal. The first was
whether the Act was facially invalid under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.1'' The second issue was whether the Act was unconstitutional
on its face under the excessive ball clause of the eighth amendment.12 The
Court held that the Bail Reform Act did not violate either the eighth or the
fifth amendment.
C. The Majority's Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinioni first addressed defendants'
argument that the Act constituted impermissible punishment in violation of
the defendants' substantive due process rights. The Court looked to the
legislative history of the Act to determine if Congress's intent in designing
the Act was to punish and expressly concluded that it was not. 26 Because
the Act was not expressly punitive, the Court appropriately applied a portion
of the test promulgated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez to determine
whether the restriction was implicitly regulatory or punitive in nature.'' 7 The
Kennedy test's first requirment is that the statute embody a non-punitive
purpose.'2 This requirement was satisfied during the prior examination of
the legislature's intent because the alternate purpose asserted was that of
regulation.'2 9 The Court then applied the second part of the test, whether
the incidents of detention were excessive in relation to the Act's goals, and
focused on procedural safeguards of the statute.1'1 More specifically, the
Court examined the circumstances under which a defendant could be de-
120. Id. at 74 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975)).
121. 794 F.2d at 71-72.
122. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 397 (1986).
123. 107 S. Ct. at 2100-01.
124. Id.
125. Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Blackmun, White, O'Conner, Scalia, and Powell, JJ.
126. Id. at 2101.
127. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). The Salerno Court applied only the latter half of the test, the
condensed version first stated in Bell, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The Bell court reduced the test to
the final two of the seven factors. See supra note 59.
128. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168.
129. 107 S. Ct. at 2101.
130. Id.
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tained, the timeliness of the detention hearing, the possible maximum length
of detention, and the conditions of confinement. 3 ' After examining these
elements of the Bail Reform Act, the Court concluded that the Act was
regulatory and, therefore, not in violation of the due process clause.'32
The Court next considered the defendants' argument that the government's
interest was insufficient to justify preventive detention. The Court conceded
that there is a general rule that persons may not be detained prior to
adjudication but noted that historically, many exceptions existed.' The
Court determined that a balancing test, similar to that used in the exception
cases, should be used.'1' This test balanced the importance of the govern-
ment's interest in preventing crime with the individual's interest in liberty.'"
Although the Court found the individual's liberty interest to be compelling,
it concluded that the individual's interest was outweighed by society's strong
interest in crime prevention.'3 6 The Court held that because only the most
dangerous criminals were covered under this Act, and the procedural safe-
guards insured against extensive and unnecessary detention, the impact of
the Act was sufficiently narrow.'"
Lastly, the Court disposed of the defendants' argument that the procedures
of the Act rendered it facially invalid. 3 ' The Court held that the Bail Reform
Act withstood this constitutional challenge. ,19 The Court noted that the Act's
procedural safeguards exceeded those found constitutional in similar situa-
tions. '40
The Supreme Court then addressed the defendants' contention that the
Bail Reform Act violated the eighth amendment. The court of appeals did
not address this issue because it found that the Act violated due process. '4'
131. Id. at 2101-02.
132. Id. at 2102.
133. Id. "Such a 'general rule' may freely be conceded, but we think that these cases show
a sufficient number of exceptions to the rule that the congressional action challenged here can
hardly be characterized as totally novel." Id. The Court cited various categories as exceptions
to this general rule including aliens, mental incompetents, juveniles, and actions taken during
time of war or national emergency. Id. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (juveniles
who pose a danger to themselves or community); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)
(mentally incompetent persons who may pose a danger to community); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 731-39 (1972) (persons accused of dangerous crimes who have become incompetent
to stand trial); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (pre-deportation proceeding detention
of potentially dangerous resident aliens); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1909) (detention
of person without probable cause during insurrection).
134. 107 S. Ct. at 2102.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2103.
137. Id. at 2102-03.
138. Id. at 2103.
139. Id. at 2104.
140. Id. at 2104. The Court found that procedural safeguards inherent in both limited post-
arrest detention and juvenile settings were lesser than those incident to the Bail Reform Act,
but not constitutionally infirm.
141. Id.
1989]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
The defendants claimed that denial of bail can only be allowed to fulfill
"the sole purpose of bail-to ensure integrity of the judicial process.""' , 2
They relied on Stack v. Boyle,"34 to support their claims. In Stack, the
defendants argued that the amount of bail set was unreasonable and should
be reduced. The Stack Court noted the limited function of bail-that of
assuring the presence of the defendent at trial-and determined that bail set
at an amount higher than needed to assure the defendent's presence was
excessive under the eight amendment.'" The Stack Court, therefore, con-
cluded that there was a -right to freedom from detention before trial. "4 The
Salerno Court, however, rejected the defendants' arguments on two grounds.
First, it held that Stack should be read narrowly and limited to the question
of whether the amount of bail itself was excessive, not whether bail was
required at all.'" Secondly, the Court looked to the text of the eighth
amendment itself and concluded that it does not explicitly limit bail to
questions of flight.'47 The only limitation it found was that the conditions
of release must not be excessive when balanced with the gravity of the crime
with which the defendant was charged. Therefore, the Court concluded that
when the government establishes a compelling justification for detaining a
defendant, the eighth amendment does not mandate release on bail.'"
D. The Dissents
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented. He asserted that
the Bail Reform Act was unconstitutional. Justice Marshall separated his
analysis into four parts. In the first section, Justice Marshall contended that
the Court did not have the jurisdiction to hear the case.'" 9 In the second
section, the dissent examined the majority's due process and excessive bail
arguments. Justice Marshall concluded that the majority erred when it
essentially held that the only due process right protectable in this scenario
was the right to be free from punishment. Justice Marshall also accused the
majority of simply relabeling punishment as regulation in order to eliminate
the controversy.' 50
142. Id.
143. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
144. Id. at 5.
145. Id. at 6.
146. 107 S. Ct. at 2104.
147. "Nothing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible government considerations
solely to questions of flight." Id. at 2105.
148. Id. at 2105.
149. Id. at 2106-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In the first section, the dissent argued that the
majority used Salerno as a "test" case, because it felt that the issue was important, when in
reality it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. At the time the case actually came before the
Court, Salerno had been convicted and sentenced and Cafaro had been released on-a recogni-
zance bond because he had agreed to become a government witness. The dissent argued that
this rendered the case moot. If certiorari was originally granted when there was jurisdiction,
under article Ill of the United States Constitution which requires a live case or controversy, it
must be denied when there is no longer a controversy.
150. Id. at 2108.
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The dissent also found fault with the majority's analysis of the eighth
amendment argument. First, the dissent argued that there was no practical
difference between excessive bail and a total denial of bail under the Act.
Justice Marshall stated that based on the majority's equation of the two,
there is no real need for the Bail Reform Act.' Secondly, after interpreting
the Court's opinion to suggest that the excessive bail clause may only refer
to the judiciary, Justice Marshall firmly stated that statutes are subject to
the constitution and those statutes which allow what is constitutionally
forbidden cannot be upheld. If Congress cannot establish a sufficiently
compelling justification, the constitution prohibits Congress from enacting
the statute.52
In its third section, the dissent analyzed the concept of "presumption of
innocence" in an historical context and argued that this presumption is
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"'5 and "established beyond
legislative contravention of the Due Process Clause.' 5 4 Justice Marshall
strongly disagreed with the majority's apparent use of an indictment to create
a special class of persons. He argued that the indictment cannot be used as
evidence to permit detention, when it would be unconstitutional to detain
the defendent after he was acquitted. The indictment can only be used as
evidence that there will be a trial, and therefore, the only valid purpose for
detention under an indictment is to ensure that the trial takes place."' Justice
Marshall found that this analysis was consistent with the traditional justifi-
cation for denying bail, that of ensuring the integrity of the judicial process.'6
Finally, the dissent criticized the coercive power of the authority which
would be granted to the government under the Bail Reform Act. The
government would have the option to detain because of the defendant's
apparent dangerousness, but then to release the defendant when it suits its
goals. 57 Justice Marshall believed that this practice had the potential for
abuse. He stated that preserving constitutional values is vital, and that
although protecting society from danger is an important goal, society has
always paid a cost in upholding constitutional principles., s
Justice Stevens also wrote a dissent although he saw no need for such a
broad statement as Justice Marshall's.5 9 Justice Stevens' dissent agreed that
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2108-09.
153. Id. at 2110 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
154. Id. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . ."); Taylor v.
Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978) (refusal to instruct jury on presumption of innocence
violated fourteenth amendment due process); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976)
("presumption of innocence ... is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of
criminal justice").
155. 107 U.S. at 2110.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2111.
158. Id. at 2112. "[Slometimes we must pay substantial social costs as a result of our
committment to the values we espouse." Id.
159. Id. at 2112 (Stevens. J., dissenting).
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the majority's use of an indictment to create a special class of persons was
wrong. His dissent also stated that the majority's decision undermines es-
tablished fundamental principles.I16
V. ANALYsis
The Supreme Court in Salerno used the Kennedy test to classify preventive
detention as regulatory in nature. 6' Applying this analysis, the Court held
that the Act did not violate due process because regulation is permissible
prior to adjudication, whereas punishment is not. 62 The Kennedy test is
designed to be applied in the absence of an express legislative intent to
punish.' 63 The Court was correct in its decision to apply the test, because
punitive intent was admittedly absent from the legislative history of the Bail
Reform Act. However, in reaching its conclusion to uphold the Act, the
Supreme Court did not apply this test correctly.
The Court applied the condensed version of the test from Bell v. Wolfish. '4
However, the Court should have used the entire Kennedy test. The true
Kennedy test more accurately balances all the important considerations which
should be weighed in reaching a conclusion regarding the constitutionality
of restrictions on bail.
The Bell version of the test should not be given great weight for two
reasons. First, in Bell, any discussion of the test was merely dicta. The Court
did not need to, and in fact did not, apply this test to reach its holding.
Second, the Bell Court was vague as to what standard should be used, and
it appeared to contradict itself. In Bell, the court first stated that all the
factors in Kennedy should be used as guideposts in reaching a decision. The
Court then isolated two of the factors to be used in the determination and
left out five of the "guideposts."' 6 For these two reasons, the Bell version
of the Kennedy test should not dictate how the test should be applied. A
better balance can be achieved by using the complete list of factors described
in Kennedy. If the complete Kennedy test is applied to the Bail Reform Act,
the inevitable conclusion is that the Act should be classified as punitive in
nature.
160. Justice Stevens was also uneasy about the jurisdictional basis of this decision. Id. at
2113.
161. Id. at 2101.
162. Id. Punishment before trial violates the due process clause because the clause requires
that a person accused of a crime be permitted to prove his innocence in a court of law before
he is held liable for his actions. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16. See also United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (unconstitutional to punish by legislative enactment prior to
adjudication); Tribe, supra note 24, at 389 (cannot condemn man for committing a crime when
commission has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
163. "Absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a statute,
these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face." Kennedy, 372 U.S. at
169.
164. 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979).
165. Id. These two "guideposts" make up the condensed version of the test.
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A. Factors Used In The Court's Analysis
1. Legislative history factor
In applying the Kennedy test, the Court first looked to the purpose of
pretrial detention.'" If the Act had a purpose other than regulation, it could
not stand. The Court correctly looked to the intent of the legislature to
make this determination. The Court concluded that legislative history indi-
cated that Congress did not design the Act with the intent to impose punitive
sanctions on dangerous individuals. 67 It held that the Bail Reform Act,
therefore, had no alternate purpose and was clearly regulatory in nature.
Although it was proper for the Court to look to the legislative intent, the
legislature in this case never made its own determination of whether the
pretrial detention mandated by the Act was punitive or regulatory. The
Court's strong reliance on this incomplete "legislative determination," there-
fore, is a major weakness in the Court's analysis. The legislature merely
deferred to a previous Supreme Court case, Bell v. Wolfish, to support its
determination that preventive detention was regulatory;'" nothing else in the
legislative history supports this conclusion. Congress, however, read this case
out of context. Bell did not analyze pretrial detention as it applied to
dangerousness, but rather, the Court evaluated the role of pretrial detention
in ensuring the promotion of justice. 69
In Bell, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of several
restrictions imposed on persons in jail, whether already convicted, or detained
before trial without bail for the traditional reason of ensuring the integrity
of the judicial process. 70 The Court did not address the constitutionality of
the detention itself, because these were situations in which detention was
traditionally allowed. The Court applied the Kennedy test to prison condi-
tions and concluded that those particular conditions did not amount to
punishment for either the convicted prisoners or the pretrial detainees. '7'
The Court applied the test to each condition a prisoner was subjected to
while being detained. 72 The Court's analysis focused on the restrictions that
occur once a defendant has been legitimately detained and evaluated "[the]
legitimate interests that stem from [the government's] need to manage the
166. 107 S. Ct. at 2101.
167. Id. The Supreme Court relies on 1984 S. REP., supra note 23, at 1. 1984 U.S. CODE
CoNo. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3191, for the conclusion that the Act is regulatory.
168. 1984 S. REP., supra note 23 at 8, 1984 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADaM. Naws at 3191
(citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
169. 441 U.S. at 536.
170. In Bell, decided in 1979, five years prior to the enactment of the Bail Reform Act, the
Court did not address the issue of denial of bail based on propensity for dangerousness. Id. at
534 n.15.
171. Id. at 537.
172. Id. at 540.
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facility ... legitimate operational conerns."'7 The Court specifically stated
that it was not attempting to define what governmental interests may justify
pretrial detention itself. 7 4
Therefore, in Salerno, the Supreme Court should not have relied so heavily
on the legislature's finding of regulatory intent. The legislature relied on
Bell, but Bell never addressed the issue of whether pretrial, detention, for
reasons other than tb bring the defendant to trial or ensure security of the
penal system, was regulatory.
2. Speedy Trial Act factor
The Supreme Court next applied the second factor of the abbreviated
Kennedy test, whether the Bail Reform Act is excessive in relation to the
regulatory goal it intended to achieve." The Court relied primarily on four
factors in its analysis: (1) the arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention
hearing; (2) the Act carefully limits the circumstances under which detention
may be sought; (3) the conditions of imprisonment appear to reflect regu-
latory purposes; and (4) the maximum limit of pretrial detention is limited
by the Speedy Trial Act. 76 The Court concluded that these four procedural
safeguards render the Bail Reform Act a permissible regulation.1
7
The Court, however, erred in relying on the Speedy Trial Act as a
procedural safeguard to conclude that the Act is regulatory in nature.
Assuming that the Act is otherwise a permissible regulation, 78 the use of
the Speedy Trial Act as the maximum time limit for preventive detention
renders the Act unconstitutional. The Speedy Trial Act as a maximum time
limit for detention is analogous to having no time limit at all. The Speedy
Trial Act's time limit provisions are "illusory" because the catch-all "ex-
cludable delay" provision offsets the seemingly strict time limit.179 This
creates a defacto jail sentence and causes the Act to become impermissible
173. Id. "It is enough simply to recognize that in addition to ensuring the detainees' presence
at trial, the'effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a
valid objective..'.." Id.
174. Id. "We, therefore, have no occasion to consider whether any other government
objectives may constitutionally justify pretrial detention." Id. at 534 n.l$.
175. 107 S. Ct. at 2101.
176. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74.
177. 107 S. Ct. at 2102.
178. This Note assumes that detention may be regulatory for purposes of analysis of the
Speedy Trial Act's time limit provision.
179. [The Speedy Trial Act's] requirement of trial within 90 days for persons who
have been detained has turned out to be illusory, in large part because the provision
covering detainees also incorporates ... the periods of excludable time enumerated
in Section 3161(h) in computing the 90-day time limitation. As a result, detention
can continue while all of the 18 different circumstances enumerated in section
3161(h) give rise to excludable delay.
United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 394-95 (3d Cir. 1986) (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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punishment before adjudication which violates due process. 18° Although the
initial purpose behind the detention may be regulatory, it does not always
remain so as the length of the detention increases. 8' Because it is impossible
to draw a line after which the duration of detention becomes unconstitutional,
the Act should be stricken as invalid per se, not merely on a case by case
basis.182
The Bail Reform Act is very different than the preventive detention
statutes upheld in Schall v. Martin' and United Sttates v. Edwardsi"
because it uses the Speedy Trial Act as a maximum time limit. In Schall,
a case in which juveniles were detained under a statute similar to the Bail
Reform Act, the maximum time period for detention was 17 days."' The
Supreme Court upheld this statute, relying in part on the added factor that
children have a lesser liberty interest than adults because they are always
in some type of custodial situation until the age of emancipation. 8 6 In
Edwards, there was a strictly enforced maximum time limit of 90 days
which included an initial 60 day detention with one 30 day extension for
good cause shown. 8 '
Congress intended the time limit provisions of the Speedy Trial Act of
1974 to serve as the maximum length of detention for pretrial detainees
under the Bail Reform Act.' Several members of Congress expressed
concern about setting a time limit for detention before trial. 189 Two concerns
were that the time limit would not be sufficient to prepare for complex
trials, and that the time period of detention could become lengthy or even
indefinite. Congress apparently felt that using the Speedy Trial Act would
prevent these problems.19' The Speedy Trial Act's escape clause alleviated
congressional fears that there would not be enough time to prepare complex
cases. Congress did not foresee, however, that this escape clause would be
abused, causing cases to be continued for longer periods of time than it
180. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
182. United States v. LoFranco, 620 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). "There is a danger of
a violation of due process in any detention without bail. But there is no clear line beyond
which detention without bail becomes unconstitutional, because it is impossible to predict
whether or on what charges a defendant will be convicted." Id. at 1325.
183. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
184. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. App. 1981).
185. N.Y. Jun. LAW § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983).
186. 467 U.S. at 265.
187. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(dX4) (Supp. 1986).
188. 1984 S. RP., supra note 23, at 22 n.63, 1984 U.S. CoDs CoNG. & Anuir. NEws at
3205 n.63.
189. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearings on S. 829 Before the Sub.
Committtee on Criminal Law of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
65 (1983) (statement of Sen. Spector).
190. Ninety days alleviates the problem of an excessive detention period, but continuance
provisions allow enough time to prepare for complex trials. 130 CoNo. REc. S944 (daily ed.
Feb. 3, 1984) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
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ever anticipated.The section 3161(h)(8)(A) "ends of justice" exclusion of
the Speedy Trial Act, which acts as a catchall, is especially disturbing
because courts have generally interpreted it as a sufficient basis to justify
delay.'
Generally, the periods of these "ends of justice" continuances are ex-
cludable from the 90 day time limit in which the defendant must be brought
to trial. Courts are lenient in allowing the date of trial to be extended for
good cause shown' 9 and have granted these types of continuances for a
wide variety of reasons. 93
One example of this leniency occurred when the Tenth Circuit granted
a victim of assault a continuance to pursue his political campaign without
interference in United States v. Guerro.1'" In Guerro, the defendant threw
eggs at a presidential candidate during a political rally and was convicted
of assault. The trial court granted a 45 day continuance to allow the
candidate to finish his presidential campaign. The defendant argued on
appeal that the trial court failed to comply with the Speedy Trial Act. The
court held that the reasons for continuance outweighed the interests of the
defendant, and the continuance was properly excluded from the 90 day
time limit. 95
In United States v. Henderson, 96 the Ninth Circuit did not even reach
the issue of whether the delay granted was reasonable. The court instead
held that delays excludable from the Speedy Trial Act time limit calculation
are automatic. 19' Therefore, the court excluded 720 of 786 days of pretrial
detention, and dismissed the defendant's claim that there was a violation
of the Speedy Trial Act.' g"
191. Note, Pretrial Incarceration, supra note 6, at 1068. This catch-all exclusion reads:
Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own
motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the
attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis
of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the
best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
18 US.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1982).
192. See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
193. Courts continually justify delay because of confusion with the rules. See United States
v. Didier, 542 F.2d 1182, 1185 (2nd Cir. 1976); United States v. Drummond, 511 F.2d 1049,
1053-54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 844 (1975); United States v. Roemer, 514 F.2d 1377,
1381-82 (2d Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Henry, 698 F.2d 1172-73 (11th Cir. 1983).
There, the duration of continuances was held excludable from the court's computation of the
70 day period. The defendant argued that the government's failure to comply with pretrial
discovery deadlines forced him to either proceed to trial unprepared or to move for continuance.
194. 667 F.2d 862, 867 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 964 (1981).
195. The court held that the victim's interests were compelling because the right to campaign
for a political office is protected by the Constitution. Id. at 867.
196. 746 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1871 (1986).
197. Id. at 622. The court interpreted the language in section 3161(h)(1)(f) which excludes:
"delay resulting from any pretrial motion," as an automatic exclusion which, therefore, did
not require the district court to determine whether or not the delay was reasonable. Id. See
United States v. Horton, 705 F.2d 1414, 1416 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 997 (1983)
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Furthermore, as a particular trial becomes more complex, the time needed
to prepare increases, as do the continuances. This situation is aggravated by
the lenient attitude of the courts to grant continuances because they are
aware of the problems in case preparation.'" All the above exceptions allow
lengthy trial delays, but do not designate a time when these delays may be
considered violative of the detainee's due process rights.2m
Several courts which have decided cases based on the Bail Reform Act
have held that the length of pretrial detention violated due process.20 This
is an indication that this situation occurs often enough that the Speedy Trial
Act is not an adequate safeguard. Because the Speedy Trial Act does not
achieve its purpose of providing speedy trials, the detention provision con-
stitutes punishment because it may not be properly applied. To examine
detention on a case by case basis and confine the analysis to the facts does
not adequately protect the interests of those detained. After the detainee has
been imprisoned for an unconstitutional period, nothing can adequately
compensate him for the harm that has been done; safeguards must be
developed to prevent the threat of unconstitutional detention before the
threat appears.
The Court in Salerno relied on the Speedy Trial Act as a procedural
safeguard when applying the second factor of the abbreviated Kennedy test.
Therefore, its conclusion should be reversed because the Speedy Trial Act is
not an adequate procedural safeguard.
The five "guidepost" factors, discussed below, indicate that the Bail
Reform Act is punishment. When combining the five factors that the Court
failed to use with a correct application of the two factors that the Salerno
Court used, the analysis overwhelmingly indicates that the Act impermissibly
allows punishment.
B. Factors The Court Ignores
The first of the five Kennedy "guidepost" factors requires an analysis of
whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint.2 It is
("terms of [the] exclusion [for pretrial motions] ... are all but absolute"); United States v.
Brim, 630 F.2d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir.) (automatic exclusion), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 966 (1980).
But see United States v. Novak, 715 F.2d 810, 819-20 (3d Cir.) (delay from pretrial motions
must be reasonable), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1983); United States v. Cobb, 697 F.2d 38,
43-44 (2d Cir. 1982) (delay from pretrial motions must be reasonable).
198. An additional problem with the "good cause" exclusion is that under section 3161(h)(8)(A)
there is no requirement that the court contemporaneously record its basis to grant a continuance
even if the continuance is required to be reasonable. "Language of the statute does not specify
when the court's findings must be recorded . . . . " United States v. Brooks, 697 F.2d 517,
522 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1073 (1982).
199. Id. at 519. Because of the complicated nature of the case and because some of the
defendants do not have counsel, the "ends of justice continuance" is warranted. Id. See also
Tribe, supra note 24, at 392 ("If ... you are not ready to present your defense, your
confinement will last as long as you find it necessary to delay your trial.").
200. Note, Pretrial Incarceration, supra note 6, at 1056.
201. See supra notes 89-97.
202. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168.
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obvious that detention imposes an affirmative restraint on a detainee. The
very nature of detention is to restrict a person's mobility by placing him in
a controlled environment. This enables the government to watch over the
detainee. In this situation, the defendant is monitored so that he will not be
a danger to society during the pretrial stage. In fact, the majority opinion
in Salerno conceded that the detainee's liberty interest is infringed by pretrial
detention.=
The second factor requires an examination of the historical classification
of preventive detention.1 Detention of this type for competent persons20
has long been viewed as punishment.06 Convicted prisoners are "detained"
when they are sent to the penitentiary. Juvenile delinquents are sent to
detention centers when they are found to be "problem children. '"' Although
these detentions may also serve to rehabilitate, the detention is primarily
punitive because those detained committed dangerous crimes.
The third factor to look at is scienter; whether the Act comes into play
only on a finding that the accused was aware of his wrongdoing.m The
individual is detained if the government adjudges that he will have a pro-
pensity to commit dangerous acts. Thus, the detention must be analogized
with sanctions for committing a strict liability offense. Because there has
been an increase in strict liability crimes in which knowledge is no longer a
prerequisite to culpability, 9 the defendant's state of mind is not relevant to
a determination of whether preventive detention is punitive or regulatory.
The fourth factor asks whether the application of the Act will achieve the
traditional retributive and deterrent goals of punishment.210 The theory of
retribution is based on the principle that the rules benefit all of society, and
203. 107 S. Ct. at 2103. "We do not minimize the importance and fundamental nature of
this right. But... this right may, in circumstances where the government's interest is sufficiently
weighty, be subordinated to greater needs of society." Id.
204. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168.
205. Incompetents and others such as the criminally insane have generally been treated
differently. See e.g.. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (mentally incompetent persons
who pose. a danger to the community may be constitutionally detained); Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972) (constitutional detention of persons accused of dangerous crimes who have
become imcompetent to stand trial). However, dangerous resident aliens have also been an
exception, see Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1986) (detention prior to deportation
is constitutional); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (constitutional detention of dangerous
resident alien prior to deportation hearing).
206. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 998. "The government does not dispute that detention
of a competent adult to prevent commission of crime may not be imposed as punishment unless
there has been an adjudication of guilt." Id.
207. Schall, 467 U.S. at 257-58 n.5.
208. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168.
209. S. KLsti, S. Scm.Hom & M. PAULSEN, CRiaMNAL LAw AND rrs PRocEssEs: CASES
AmD MATwuALs 328 (4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter LAxisH, CxnaNAt LAw].
210. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168. "It would be archaic to limit the definition of 'punishment'
to 'retribution.' Punishment serves several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent, and
preventive." United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965).
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one who breaches the rule owes a debt to society in the form of punishment.2"
Imprisonment after a crime is clearly punishment or the paying of the debt.
It is difficult, however, to distinguish between imprisonment which is clearly
considered punishment and pretrial detention which is characterized as reg-
ulatory. The purpose of retribution would appear to be accomplished in
both cases. The purpose of deterrence is to discourage the commission of
future crimes.2 12 Potential criminals are deterred from committing crimes by
the threat of incarceration. Preventive detention increases this deterrence
because the threat of permanent, lengthy incarceration is, even more severe.
Persons prone to commit crimes are discouraged from doing so even when
they are convinced that they will not be convicted if apprehended. The
rationale behind this theory is that a person who falls into one of the serious
crime categories may be imprisoned for a significant amount of time213 before
trial begins.
. Finally, the Supreme Court failed to address the factor of whether the
Act actually applies to criminal conduct.21 4 The analysis of this factor turns
on what type of behavior the court believes is covered by the Act. If this
factor applies to the propensity to commit dangerous acts, this is not itself
a crime. 21 However, if the Act applies to the dangerous behavior itself, it
is obviously a crime because it is exactly this type of crime that the Act is
intended to prevent. Because the Act is attempting to prevent pretrial crimes
and riot just pretrial dangerousness, it is logical that the latter interpretation
is the correct one, and it applies to criminal behavior.
Analysis of. each of these five "guideposts" points toward the determi-
nation that pretrial detention is not regulatory. Therefore, the application
of the complete test leads to the conclusion that pretrial detention is in the
category of punishment. A correct application of the factors from the
Kennedy test would demonstrate that the Bail Reform Act is not constitu-
tional.
C. The Court's Balancing Test
The Supreme Court determined that because the Act was permissible
regulation, a balancing test must next be used between the government's
interest and that of the detainee to determine which interest is more com-
211. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHLosoPHY AND PUBLIC AI' iRs 217 (1973).
212. There are two types of deterrents: 1) general-threat of punishment deters potential
offenders in the general community; and 2) special-infliction of punishment on convicted
defendants leaves them less likely to engage in crime. KAIsH, CRINUNAL LAw, supra note 209,
at 195-96.
213. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
214. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168.
215. An act must be committed before there can be a crime. A person cannot be convicted
simply because the government anticipates the person will commit an act that is a crime. "Mhe
absence of an act precludes culpability." KArIsH, CRIAUNAm LAW, supra note 209, at 259. See
4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *21.
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pelling. The test balances the government's interest in crime prevention and
a safe community with the individual's interest in liberty. The Court held
that the government's interest outweighed that of the individual because the
former interest was so compelling. 216 However valid this argument may be
in other circumstances, it is moot in cases where the action is punishment
and not regulation. It is settled that Congress cannot enact a law that makes
what is unconstitutional constitutional. Justice Marshall made this point in
his dissent, as he too felt that the Act allows impermissible punishment. 2 7
Protecting the public from dangerous criminals is a valid governmental
interest. Each day, persons who are convicted of crimes are imprisoned,
separated by gates and fences from the rest of society both as their punish-
ment and for the protection of society. However, the persons who are being
detained under the Bail Reform Act have not yet been convicted of a crime.
If a defendent is convicted at trial, the criminal justice system will protect
society by locking him away. Until then, the only constitutional action that
can be taken is to release him on ball. While there is a possibility that he
may commit a crime while out on bail, that is the chance society must take
in order to uphold the values of the constitution.2 1 1
It is well established that the government can constitutionally remand a
defendant to custody to ensure that he appear at his trial and when the
defendant has been accused of a capital crime.2 9 There is a fundamental
difference between the traditional reasons for detention and the denial of
ball due to the defendant's propensity to be dangerous. In order for the
criminal justice system to function, there must be a determination of whether
one who is accused of a crime is guilty. This is the purpose of the trial.
Without the trial, there is no assurance that justice will prevail. Therefore,
it is crucial that the trial transpire in a manner that is just and fair. The
traditional reasons for denying bail are not offensive to the constitution,
therefore, because they serve to ensure that the system does justice to the
defendant and to society.? 0
D. The Act's Procedural Safeguards
The Supreme Court addressed the defendants' constitutional challenge to
several procedural provisions of the Bail Reform Act designed to determine
216. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2103 (1987).
217. Id. at 2107-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 2112.
219. United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 380 (1st Cir. 1985). "It is well established that
the government can keep a defendant in custody to secure his presence at trial." Id.
220. "Pretrial detention to avoid undue risks of flight or jeopardy to the trial process is not
prohibited by a constitutional scheme that relies on the trial process to determine guilt and
enforce the criminal law." Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1002. See United States v. Berrios-
Berrios, 791 F.2d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The due process clause was not violated simply
because the defendants who posed a risk of flight had been incarcerated for over eight months
awaiting trial."). But see United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1451 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
("[T]he government interest in preventing disruption of the judicial system by the non-appear-
ance of a criminal defendant is not greater than the interest in preventing the harm caused by
crime.").
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the future dangerousness of the accused. 22' The purpose of these provisions
is to ensure that the judicial officer's decision to detain the defendant is
accurately made. These procedural provisions include: (a) a burden of proof
by clear and convincing evidence; "2 (b) defendant's right to counsel;2" (c)
the requirement that the judicial officer make written findings of fact; (d)
immediate appellate review of the decision;22' and, (e) the responsibility of
the judicial officer to look to the nature and circumstances of the charges,
the criminal history of the defendant, the danger to the community, and the
weight of the evidence. 226 The Court found that these provisions were con-
stitutional because they were more rigid than provisions in statutes held to
be adequate in both Schall and Gerstein. The Salerno situation is distin-
guishable from both of these cases and, therefore, provides no support for
the Court's claim that the provisions are constitutional.
The first case the Supreme Court employed to support its position was
Schall v. Martin, a case in which the Court upheld a juvenile pretrial
detention statute. 28 The Schall case should not have been used to support
the Court's position for two reasons. First, the preventive detention of
juveniles cannot be compared with that of adults because juveniles tradi-
tionally have a lesser liberty interest. The Schall Court determined that
minors are either controlled by their parents or other guardians or by the
state's parens patriae power.2 9 Until a child reaches the age of emancipation,
he is not free from the jurisdiction of restrictive adult supervision and rules.
Thus, the Court held that juveniles have a less significant interest in freedom
from institutional restraints than adults, 230 and they do not require as strin-
gent safeguards to protect their interests. The Court went on to conclude
that the state's interest in the child's welfare makes the juvenile proceeding
distinct from that of an adult criminal. Therefore, although the Bail Reform
Act's safeguards may be better than those in the juvenile preventive detention
statute, it does not follow that they are constitutional.
Second, Schall should not be used to support the Supreme Court's claim
because the Act subjects adults to harsher conditions than juveniles during
detention. Therefore, considerably more stringent safeguards are needed to
protect a detained adult than were found adequate in Schall. The major
differences between the restrictions placed on a defendant under the Act and
221. 107 S. Ct. at 2103.
222. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (Supp. 111 1985).
223. Id.
224. § 3142(i).
225. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (Supp. 111 1985).
226. § 3142(g).
227. 107 S. Ct. at 2104. The two cases in which these preventive detention statutes were
upheld are Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
228. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
229. Id. at 265. "IT]he juvenile's liberty interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be
subordinated to the State's °parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of
the child." Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 444 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)).
230. 467 U.S. at 265.
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those of the juvenile statute in Schall are twofold. First, the statute in Schall
restricts the detention of the juvenile offender to a maximum of 17 days.23'
Under the Bail Reform Act, the time limit may be indefinite. Secondly, most
of the juveniles were detained in halfway houses, not jails. Those juveniles
placed in more secure surroundings were not incarcerated with adult offen-
ders except in extraordinary situations. 22 In contrast, the Bail Reform Act
requires that the detainees be separated from convicted prisoners only "to
the extent practicable." 3 Adult detainees have been found to be subjected
to harsher conditions of detention than juveniles, including twenty-three
hour cell confinements and frequent body cavity searches . 34 The procedures
used in the detention statute in Schall cannot be compared with the Act
because the conditions are more restrictive and more likely to violate the
detainee's liberty interest. More extensive safeguards are required so that no
person will be mistakenly subject to these conditions.
The Supreme Court next stated that the restrictions were considerably
more stringent than those upheld in Gerstein v. Pugh. 21 In Gerstein, the
Court held that there must be a prompt probable cause hearing for any
defendant arrested without a warrant.2 36 The Court in Salerno described
Gerstein as a case in which the detainee would be subject to "limited
postarrest detention." 2"7 The procedure in Gerstein is only adequate for a
limited detention, until the first appearance of the defendant in front of the
judge, when the bond is set. The Bail Reform Act does not limit the detention
period in this way. Also, the Gerstein court was only addressing detention
for the traditional reasons of ensuring the integrity of the judicial process
because bail had not yet been set for the defendant. Until the first appearance,
detention was the only method to ensure that the defendant would not
disappear. Therefore, Gerstein should not have been used to support the
Supreme Court's argument with regard to the constitutionality of the pro-
cedures of the Bail Reform Act.
Although the Supreme Court and the majority of the lower courts have
seemingly decided the issue of the constitutionality of preventive detention
in favor of its being a valid regulation, the majority of commentators
disagree.23 8 In addition, the large, number of strong dissents in Supreme
231. Id. at 270.
232. Id.
233. § 3142(i)(2). The Bail Reform Act, therefore, "inevitably will permit confinement of
pretrial detainees with sentenced prisoners in some circumstances." United States v. Melendez-
Carrion, 790 F.2d at 999 n.2.
234. Comment, Liberty in the Balance, supra note 19, at 399.
235. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
236. Id. at 126.
237. 107 S. Ct. at 2104.
238. Compare Foote, supra note 71, at 964, with Alschuler, supra note 26, at 510-11
("Detention without bond of a person accused of a crime can be consistent with Anglo-
American legal tradition, with fundamental fairness and with sound policy."). But see Mitchell,
Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1969)
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Court cases such as Salerno"39 and lower court cases such as Edwardsm
cannot be ignored. These dissenters make it apparent that the Supreme
Court's stance on the Act is not accepted by all those who are familiar with
the topic.
VI. IMPACT
A. Negative Impact Of Salerno
The Supreme Court in Salerno held that the Bail Reform Act is not
unconstitutional per se, but that each case must be examined on its unique
set of facts. The Court, however, set no guidelines for the lower courts to
(preventive detention does not violate the eighth amendment, due process, or the rule of evidence
labeled the "presumption of innocence").
Professor Tribe makes it clear that he is strongly opposed to preventive detention. Tribe,
supra note 24, at 379-80. He argues that it is impermissible punishment in violation of due
process to detain a person for being dangerous before he is found guilty of a crime. "To
punish a man because he might choose to break society's rules is to condemn and therefore
punish him for nothing more than his supposed intentions." Id. at 379-80. Tribe compares
pretrial detention to statutes that have been struck down as unconstitutional because they make
status a crime. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 (1962) (unconstitutional to make
status of narcotics addict a crime); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939) (uncon-
stitutional to make status of gang member with prior convictions a crime). Tribe concludes
that dangerous propensity is also a status. Tribe, supra note 24, at 392. Cf. United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965) ("[T]he Framers had sought to bar: [the evil of] legislative
punishment ... of specifically designated persons or groups.").
Senator Ervin classifies preventive detention as "gestapo-like." Ervin, supra note 14, at 115.
He examines the D.C. Act and argues first that it violates the eighth amendment. The article
promotes a common sense interpretation of the eighth amendment. He states that an interpre-
tation that preserves individual liberty is one which requires bail. Id. at 121 (quoting Edwards,
430 A.2d at 1338 (Mack, J., dissenting)). Ervin next argues that it also violates the fifth
amendment. The article found several due process problems with the D.C. Act which it examined
and which only differs from the Bail Reform Act in its rebuttable presumption and time limit
provisions. The problems with which the-article is concerned are:
1. It is vague because it violates the requirement of informing those who are subject to it
of what conduct will subject them to penalties. See United States v. Hanks, 347 U.S. 612, 617
(1954);
2. It falls to articulate a standard by which the judicial office should determine whether
the government has met the burden of proof that the accused should be detained;
3. It violates rights of confrontation and cross-examination;
4. The inability to predict dangerousness of accused. Ervin, supra note 14, at 123-26.
239. 107 S. Ct. at 2105. See supra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
240. 430 A.2d at 1365. In Edwards, Judge Mack takes issue with the majority's conclusions
based on an historical interpretation of the eighth amendment and suggests that the majority
is allowing the legislature, through enactment of a bill, to make the eighth amendment
ineffective. He states that the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to guarantee liberty and that
cannot be taken away by a government enactment. Id. at 1367. The dissent then argues that
the accused's "classification of 'dangerousness' is arbitrary and invalid under due process ...
principles," especially when experts are uncertain as to whether there can be an ability to
predict dangerousness adequately. Id. at 1369-70.
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follow to make an adequate determination in the cases that they will have
to decide.
1. Time limit criteria
The Court acknowledged that the detention could become unconstitutional
after a certain period of time. Because the detention period in Salerno was
only three months, which in the Court's view was a permissible length, the
court did not feel it necessary to establish criteria to determine at what point
the period becomes unconstitutionally long. 24 1 This creates a problem in that
a person accused of a crime will have no indication as to whether to challenge
his detention as unconstitutional.2 2 Furthermore, by the time the defendant
challenges the length of his detention, a due process violation may have
already occurred. In this case, the fact that the defendant is released on bail
pending trial to rectify this situation does nothing to reverse the harm already
incurred. If the Court had established some guidelines to determine when
the length of detention becomes punitive, assuming that preventive detention
is not unconstitutional per se, a defendant could be released before any
constitutional violation occurred.
2. Balancing of interests criteria
The Court did not set any criteria to use in balancing the government's
interest with the individual's liberty interest or to determine situations in
which this liberty interest might prevail. The Court did not address the
factors that create problems for the detainee which should be taken into
consideration when applying the balancing test. Some of these factors are
crucial because detention creates difficulties for the defendant, in addition
to interfering with his liberty interest.
241. "We intimate no view as to the point at which detention in a particular case might
become excessively prolonged, and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress's regulatory
goal." 107 S. Ct. at 2101 n.4.
242. "When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring
factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection." New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458-60 (1981) (no general rule as to proper scope of a search of
the inside of automobile "incident to lawful arrest of its occupants."). In a comment concerning
preventive detention and criticizing Judge Feinberg's dissent in United States v. Salerno, 794
F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986), the author stated:
Judge Feinberg would not order release when lengthy detention seemed likely at
the outset. Instead, he would wait until this detention became "punitive" before
declaring it unconstitutional. For this reason, the effective representation of a
detained defendant apparently would require his lawyer to appear before a judge
at periodic interval to ask, "Now?" After an unspecified number of months during
which the judge would reply, "not yet" he would answer, "yes, now." Judge
Feinberg suggested that the moment of magic metamorphosis would vary from one
case to the next. Just when the preventive tadpole would become a punitive bullfrog
seems to be anyone's guess.
Alschuler, supra note 26, at 516-17 n.29.
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First, because the detainee is not allowed bail, he and his attorney must
prepare his defense in jail. This creates a situation in which there is less
access to witnesses, evidence, and other components which are needed to
prepare an effective defense to a criminal charge.2 3 In contrast, a defendant
who is released on bail prior to trial is unobstructed in the opportunity to
prepare his defense, and therefore, derives a benefit from this situation.2"
Second, the Act only requires that the detainee be given a reasonable
opportunity to consult with counsel.2 5 This obviously impairs the defense
of one who is a detainee when more than a reasonable opportunity to consult
may be necessary to prepare an adequate defense. Furthermore, there is no
standard as to what opportunity is reasonable and who is to determine this
standard.
Third, the detainee is adversely affected by the Speedy Trial Act's allow-
ance of continuances where the "interests of justice" would be served. The
results of this provision are sometimes the opposite of those which it seeks
to accomplish. In order to achieve justice, the judge will grant a continuance
for the detainee to prepare his case. The threat of longer detention may
discourage the detainee from making motions to continue because he will
simply not want to prolong his pretrial imprisonment. This is especially true
if the detainee is confident that he will be found innocent. However, because
the detainee has rushed his defense, he may not be adequately prepared and
this may result in his conviction. In sum, the better prepared the detainee
strives to be, the longer he is detained and the more likely that he will be
subjected to the other negative effects of detention.
The Court's balancing of the individual's liberty interest fails to take into
consideration any of these negative effects on the detainee. In addition,
because the Supreme Court's approach to a case may result in a period of
unconstitutional detention before it is challenged, these negative factors have
more of an opportunity to take effect.2" At the very least, the Court needs
to set some guidelines to ensure that the period of detention is not indefinite,
so that these negative effects are reduced to their lowest possible level.
B. Additional Problems With Preventive Detention
Now that the United States Supreme Court has put its imprimatur on the
Bail Reform Act it will be used with less apprehension and perhaps more
243. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972). See also, Wald, Pretrial Detention and
Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rsv. 631 (1964) (statistical evidence that
pretrial detainees have a greater chance of receiving prison sentences than those released on
bail).
244. Stack, 342 U.S. at 4.
245. 1984 S. RaP., supra note 23, at 25. However, the Senate Report does not furnish a
definition of the reasonable opportunity standard.
246. "The only general standard that can be stated safely is that the longer a person is held
without bail, the more likely it is that he has not received due process of law." United States
v. LoFranco, 620 F. Supp. 1324, 1325 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
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frequently. This will occur because those responsible for invoking the Act
will no longer feel threatened that it may be struck down as unconstitutional.
More frequent use of the Act will have a negative impact on the defendant
t cause preventive detention itself, apart from the inherent problems in the
Salerno Court's decision, creates additional prejudices toward the detainee.
First, a longer period of detention has been linked to an increased likeli-
hood of conviction and-longer length of imprisonment.2 7 This effect occurs
for several reasons: (1).the detainee's appearance at trial in prison clothes;
(2) a state of mind during trial in which the detainee may actually think he
is already convicted; and, (3) and inadequate preparation of the defense.'2
The detainee 'may also be compelled to plead guilty or attempt to plea
bargain to simply end the uncertain period of detention.24 9 The rationale
behind this is that the incarcerated defendant does not want to prolong the
detention. At least the defendant can see an end to detention when he is
sentenced for a crime.Y0
Second, prolonged detention can create problems in addition to interfer-
ence.with the detainee's liberty and the impact on the presentation of the
defense. The detention may cause the suspect to lose his job which will
interrupt his source of income. It may also threaten his family relationships.Y'
Finally, the threat of preventive detention may provide a hardened criminal
with less incentive to reform. " 2
The risk of these prejudices taking effect increases proportionately with
the length of detention. The Speedy Trial Act may cause the period to
become almost indefinite. This factor combined with the fact that the Act
may be used more often now that the Supreme Court in Salerno has approved
247. See Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1355 (Ferren, J., dissenting). "[Tihe defendant at liberty
pending trial stands a better chance of not being convicted or, if convicted, of not receiving a
prison sentence;" Id. (quoting Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Mahattan Bail Project: An Interim
Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 67, 86 (1963)). See also Alschuler,
supra note 26, at 517 ("[Situdies strongly suggest that pretrial incarceration makes both
conviction and severe sentence more likely"); Natalini, supra note 33. at 245 ("High positive
correlation between pretrial detention and the severity of any subsequent sentence"); Comment,
Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HtAov. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 289, 347 (1971)
("[D]efendants incarcerated before trial are more likely to be found guilty and committed to
prison than those released").
248. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1355 (Ferren, J., dissenting).
249. Id.
250. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (Supp. I 1985). The provision reads: "A defendant shall be given
credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official
detention prior to the date the sentence commences." Id.
251. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. See also Alschuler, supra note 26, at 517 ("The jobs of
detained defendants frequently disappear and friendships and family relationships disrupted.").
252. Schemes of preventive detention that lack a predicate in past conduct deny people
the chance to turn around the opportunity to choose. From the beginning, our
history has treated this opportunity as an essential attribute of human dignity and
as more than an interest to be weighed on a utilitarian scale.
Alschuler, supra note 26, at 557.
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of it, will undoubtedly have a negative effect on any defendant subject to
the Bail Reform Act in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno apparently resolved the
lower courts' controversy over the Bail Reform Act. The Court held that
preventive detention based on a fear of the defendant's danger towards the
community was constitutional. This Note has suggested several flaws in the
Court's reasoning and analysis. A proper analysis would actually result in
the opposite conclusion. Furthermore, the Court failed to articulate any
guidelines for the lower courts to follow when examining the due process
implications of the specific period of time of detention in each individual
case. Overall, the Court reached an unsatisfactory result, one which leaves
many questions unanswered. The Court should address this issue again and,
consistent with the analysis of this Note, find the Bail Reform Act uncon-
stitutional per se. At the very minimum, the Court should set up standards
for the lower courts to follow. This will assist in the resolution of the
question that is still present: whether the specific time period of detention
violates the detainee's due process rights.
Heidi Joy Herman
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